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Abstract
Objective: To synthesize the literature on the views and experiences of patients/
family members and health-care professionals (HCPs) on the disclosure of adverse 
events.
Methods: Systematic review of qualitative studies. Searches were conducted in 
MEDLINE, Embase, PubMed, CINAHL and PsycINFO. Study quality was evaluated 
using the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme tool. Qualitative data were analysed 
using a meta-ethnographic approach, comprising reciprocal syntheses of ‘patient’ 
and ‘health-care professional’ studies, combined to form a lines-of-argument synthe-
sis embodying both perspectives.
Results: Fifteen studies were included in the final syntheses. The results high-
lighted that there is a difference in attitudes and expectations between patients and 
HCPs regarding the disclosure conversation. Patients/family members expressed a 
need for information, the importance of sincere regret and a promise of improve-
ment. However, HCPs faced several barriers, which hindered appropriate disclosure 
practices. These included difficulty of disclosure in a blame culture, avoidance of 
litigation, lack of skills on how to conduct disclosure and inconsistent guidance. A 
lines-of-argument synthesis is presented that identified both the key elements of an 
ideal disclosure desired by patients and the facilitators for HCPs, which can increase 
the likelihood of this taking place.
Conclusions: Although patients/family members and HCPs both advocate disclosure, 
several barriers prevent HCPs from conducting disclosure effectively. Both groups 
have different needs for disclosure. To meet patients’ requirements, training on dis-
closure for HCPs and the development of an open, transparent culture within organi-
zations are potential areas for intervention.
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1  | INTRODUC TION
The Institute of Medicine report, To Err is Human (1999) raised 
awareness about the multitude of clinical errors that occur in health 
care.1 An important element in managing the consequences of clini-
cal errors is disclosure.2 Adverse events are all harms to a patient oc-
curring in the patient care setting that are not due to the underlying 
illness itself.3 Disclosure is the process by which an adverse event 
is communicated to the patient.4 Studies from developed countries 
have reported that adverse events occur in 0.4%-16% of hospital ad-
missions.5-9 Although limited research has been conducted on the 
occurrence of errors in developing countries, it is evident they also 
suffer from safety problems.10,11
Disclosure is imperative as health-care professionals (HCPs/
HCP) have a responsibility to be open about adverse events and pa-
tients have the right to know what has happened.12 Disclosure main-
tains trust between patients and HCPs, and failure to disclose can 
result in increased litigation by patients4,13,14 Frameworks have been 
developed in several countries (UK, Australia, Canada and USA) to 
guide adverse event disclosure.12 Although transparency and open-
ness are promoted in these policies, research suggests that disclo-
sure does not always occur.15,16 Research remains limited on the 
perspectives of patients and HCPs on adverse event disclosure. A 
previous comprehensive review on disclosure has been conducted17; 
however, the questions still remain about how to best disclose ad-
verse events to patients and ways in which HCPs can be supported 
to meet the needs of patients. Exploring both patients’ and HCPs’ 
views on disclosure will help understand the expectations, barriers 
and challenges faced by each group. This can help to generate inter-
ventions that are effective and practical for both patients and HCPs. 
In this review, we aimed to synthesize the views and experiences of 
patients and HCPs on the disclosure of adverse events, and identify 
the barriers and facilitators to disclosure faced by HCPs. This is the 
first review to synthesize the views of patients and HCPs, using a 
qualitative synthesis approach. We used a meta-ethnographic syn-
thesis approach developed by Noblit and Hare18 and adopted by 
Britten et al19 and Campbell et al20 A meta-ethnographic synthesis 
was chosen as it offers a unique systematic analysis process to pro-
vide evidence on patients’ and HCPs’ views and experiences on the 
disclosure of adverse events. Synthesizing qualitative studies using 
this approach can provide important theoretical and conceptual con-
tributions to improve health-care policy and practice.
2  | METHODS
A systematic search of qualitative studies was conducted, and data 
from included studies were synthesized using a meta-ethnographic 
approach. The review was reported according to the PRISMA guide-
lines.21 The eMERGe reporting guidance22 was also followed to con-
duct and report this meta-ethnography.
2.1 | Search strategy and data sources
Five electronic databases were systematically searched: MEDLINE, 
Embase, PubMed, CINAHL and PsycINFO (see Appendix S1). The 
search strategy included a combination of free-text searching of the 
three main concepts being examined in this review (disclosure, inci-
dent and experience) and was developed from an existing system-
atic review.21 A comprehensive set of search strategies were used in 
order to identify all available studies. Searches were conducted from 
inception to February 2017, updated to 2018.
2.2 | Eligibility criteria
Papers were included if they were in a health-care setting, published 
in English and involved qualitative data collection and analysis. 
Studies focusing on breaking bad news were excluded. Grey litera-
ture was also excluded.
2.3 | Study selection
Study selection followed PRISMA guidelines (Figure S1). Two re-
viewers independently screened 10% of the abstracts (RS and JJ), 
and Cohen's kappa statistic was used to assess inter-rater reliability 
(k ≥ 0.7). Once inter-rater reliability was confirmed, remaining ab-
stracts were screened by one reviewer (RS). Full texts were screened 
by RS, and all were double-screened by JJ and RL. Disagreements 
were resolved through discussion between the three reviewers.
2.4 | Critical appraisal
To assess study quality, the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme 
(CASP) qualitative research checklist was used.23 This tool has been 
previously used by published reviews of qualitative studies.24-27 
All studies were critically appraised, and each study was assigned 
a numerical score out of ten, where a higher score correlated with 
higher quality.24 The two highest ranked studies were used as index 
studies and were the first studies from which concepts were trans-
lated into other studies, thereby shaping the analysis.28 This process 
was carried out independently by two authors, and scores were dis-
cussed to check for consistency (RS and JJ). Disagreements were 
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resolved through discussion. No studies were excluded because of 
quality of appraisal. None of the studies were rated as being ‘very 
low’, and a majority of the studies were rated as being of ‘high qual-
ity’. Most studies reported on the methodological framework used 
and provided detailed descriptions of the data analysis methods. 
However, authors across the studies consistently failed to report 
on whether the relationship between the researcher and participant 
was considered.
3  | DATA E X TR AC TION
Two standardized data extraction forms were developed based on 
a published meta-ethnography.26 Descriptive data were extracted 
in one form by RS (study population, sample characteristics, coun-
try of origin, methods including data collection and data synthesis, 
and study conclusions). Key concepts or ‘second-order constructs’ 
(interpretations made by the primary authors) were extracted by 
RS and JJ into a table in Microsoft Word, alongside the illustrative 
quotations from study participants (‘first-order constructs’). To 
preserve the primary authors’ context and second-order construct 
meaning, the authors’ own terminology and definitions were main-
tained. The completed forms were discussed and examined for 
consistency, and items were assembled into common groups prior 
to analysis.
4  | DATA SYNTHESIS
A meta-ethnographic approach was used to synthesize the find-
ings. Meta-ethnography provides an alternative to traditional ag-
gregative methods of synthesis and supports the development of 
analytical rather than descriptive findings.29 Meta-ethnography 
relies on a process of ‘translation’ where key concepts from one 
study are introduced into another, and assessed to the extent to 
which they can account for a particular phenomenon within a dif-
ferent context.18,24 Key concepts also known as ‘second-order’ 
constructs are interpretations made by authors of the included 
studies. During this process of translation, new interpretations 
are developed, which are known as ‘third-order’ constructs. 
These comprise a new understanding of the phenomena under 
study.24 The synthesis involves deciding whether the studies are 
sufficiently similar in their focus to allow for a reciprocal transla-
tion, or if the studies refute each other, a refutational synthesis is 
conducted.
The synthesis process for this review consisted of three stages: 
(a) a reciprocal translation of the ‘patient’ studies to understand 
their views on the disclosure process of adverse events; (b) two 
reciprocal translations of the ‘HCP’ [health-care professional] 
studies (i) to understand HCPs’ views on the disclosure process 
of adverse events and (ii) to understand the barriers to disclo-
sure faced by HCPs; and (c) a lines-of-argument synthesis of all 
the studies to outline how patients’ and HCPs’ views differ on 
disclosure and how the barriers faced by HCPs may contribute 
towards this difference in disclosure views. This was an iterative 
process, and all three authors (R.S, R.L and J.J) were involved in 
the data synthesis.
The synthesis process began by repeatedly reading the included 
studies and familiarization with key concepts and metaphors. The 
‘raw data’ were extracted from each study including first-order 
constructs (participant quotations) and second-order constructs 
(primary author interpretations). Contextual information from each 
study was also extracted. In order to determine how the studies were 
related, common concepts from studies were grouped. This was ap-
proached by gathering similar themes from studies into categories 
of shared meaning.22 The studies were sufficiently similar in their 
focus to allow for reciprocal translation syntheses. Reciprocal trans-
lation was approached by organizing the second-order constructs 
thematically, by grouping concepts with similar meanings. The stud-
ies within each grouping were then arranged chronologically (from 
the highest to lowest scoring paper based on quality appraisal). The 
concepts within each of the groupings were compared account by 
account in a process similar to the method of constant comparison. 
During this phase, the reviewers referred back to the table of study 
characteristics to use as a context for comparison and the original 
full-text papers. We chose to conduct a lines-of-argument synthesis 
as the concepts from the ‘patient’ and ‘HCP’ studies were not strictly 
contradictory in nature, but more accurately described alternative 




Fifteen studies were included (Table 1). Seven were with HCPs, 4 
were with patients (including family members or the general pub-
lic), and 4 included both patients (including family members or the 
general public) and HCPs. These were published between 2003 
and 2017 and involved 1205 participants. Participants were 376 
patients and family members (including 18 members of the public) 
and 829 HCPs. HCPs included doctors, nurses, surgeons, paedi-
atric residents and anaesthesiologists. Studies were from Canada 
(two studies), USA (six studies), UK (one study), Australia (three 
studies), Switzerland (one study), Spain (one study) and Korea (one 
study).
The following sections show reciprocal translations of ‘patient’ 
and ‘HCP’ studies, followed by a lines-of-argument synthesis (see 
Appendix S3 for reciprocal translation findings).
5.2 | Reciprocal translation of patient studies
Reciprocal translation of key concepts extracted from the 8 ‘patient’ 
studies synthesized 3 third-order constructs: ‘Need for information’, 
     |  573SATTAR eT Al.
‘Importance of sincere regret’ and ‘Promise of improvement’ 
(Table 2).
5.2.1 | Need for information
Patients felt that they were not provided with the information they 
needed.30-33 This led to worries about what was going to happen 
to them next.30 Patients consistently emphasized the importance of 
receiving relevant information. However, obtaining information was 
problematic, difficult and time-consuming.34 Patients also believed 
they had a right to receive information and full disclosure.33 Patients 
wanted HCPs to inform them comprehensively about the adverse 
event, the management plan and the investigation. Patients did not 
want to have to ask numerous questions of their doctor. Patients 
threatened legal action in order to receive information and stated 
it was refreshing when they did not have to battle with insurance 
companies to get information.30 Only in one study were patients 
satisfied with the information provided to them during the disclo-
sure process and still had confidence in their HCP as a result of him 
being honest: ‘he laid it on the line and gave me the facts’.30
5.2.2 | Importance of sincere regret
A predominant theme related to the need for accountability and 
an apology. Patients said they expected the HCPs delivering the 
disclosure conversation to acknowledge what had happened and 
take responsibility for their actions.30,31,35,36The inability to admit 
a mistake by HCPs and abnegating responsibility led to patient 
frustrations and disappointment.30,32 When HCPs took respon-
sibility, the patient-professional relationship improved and there 
was an increased sense of trust from patients.30,32 For some pa-
tients, assuming responsibility was seen as a pre-requisite for 
learning. Patients indicated they wanted HCPs and institutions to 
regret what had happened:‘…it made me feel that I could trust my 
TA B L E  1   Study characteristics
Author (s) Year Country Participants
Data collection 
method
Method of data 
analysis
Gallagher et al35 2003 USA 52 patients and 46 health-care professionals 
(physicians)
Focus groups Qualitative data 
analysis




Fein et al43 2005 USA 204 health-care professionals (nurses, residents, 
physicians, administrators) and 36 patients
Focus groups Qualitative data 
analysis
Espin et al33 2006 Canada 28 health-care professionals (surgeons, nurses 
and anaesthesiologists) and 11 patients
Interviews Iterative grounded 
theory approach
Fein et al39 2007 USA 204 health-care professionals (nurses, physicians 
and residents)




Iedema et al32 2008 Australia 23 patients and family members Interviews Thematic 
discourse analysis
Iedema et al34 2008 Australia 131 health-care staff and 23 patients Interviews Semantic discourse 
analysis
Shannon et al15 2009 USA 96 health-care professionals (nurses) Focus groups Qualitative 
content analysis
Coffey et al42 2010 Canada 24 health-care professionals (paediatric 
residents)
Focus groups Thematic analysis
Iedema et al31 2011 Australia 119 patients and family members Interviews Discourse analysis
Mazor et al36 2013 USA 78 patients Interviews Directed content 
analysis
McLennan et al37 2016 Switzerland 18 health-care professionals (nurses) Interviews Conventional 
content analysis
Mira et al40 2016 Spain 27 health-care professionals (15 physicians and 
12 nurses)
Focus groups Qualitative data 
analysis
Ock et al37 2016 Korea 16 health-care professionals (physicians) and 18 





Harrison et al41 2017 UK 13 doctors and 22 nurses Interviews Framework 
analysis
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TA B L E  2   Examples of reciprocal translations for ‘patients’ and ‘HCPs’
Third-order construct Second-order construct First-order constructs
Third-order constructs (higher 
order interpretations developed 




interpretations of the 
primary data—metaphorical 
themes or concepts)
First-order constructs (primary data reported in each paper (participant 
quotations))
Patient studies
Need for information Patient frustrations30 ‘I wanted as much…whether I understood it or not. I wanted to hear it. I 
wanted details because then I could sort through it in my head, and then 
come to my own conclusions’30
Inadequate preparation for 
open disclosure31
‘We want to know what happened that day. Why was she moved from the 
room?..That could have contributed to her disorientation…They said oh 
well, we can't really give you that information’31
Full disclosure33 ‘Well it's my body, it's not the surgeon's body, and so I would want to 
know all the details’33
Importance of sincere regret Patient frustration30 ‘As far as just the medical people involved. That was extremely frustrating 
for me because nobody was willing to say that they made a mistake’ (29); 
‘I just wanted him to take responsibility for it. ‘Look I’m sorry I did this 
and I’ll do whatever it takes to make things right’. Just own up to what 
happened’30
Was an apology offered and 
of what kind?32
‘But it would have been nice if someone had have just acknowledged and 
said ‘this is our fault’…‘I definitely didn't like the defensive nature of the 
people involved…they were blaming the cancer’32
Responsibility36 ‘Taking responsibility, that's kind of what it's all about…it made me feel 
that I could trust my PCP because I mean she took responsibility…had 
remorse about what happened. She wasn't defensive about it…it goes a 
long way for me if a person can acknowledge ‘I made a mistake’ 36
Importance of delivering an 
apology in open disclosure37
When a patient is harmed or dies, we want a whole hearted apology. 
Medical disputes come later on. Money and whatnot comes second… A 
good tongue is a good weapon, you know. With a heartfelt ‘sorry’….37
Promise of improvement Need to promise recurrence 
prevention in ambiguous 
medical errors37
‘Well assuring recurrence prevention, this is a must, whatever the 
case….I’m sure when doctors say how sorry they are for what happened 
and reassure [the patients] that they'll make an effort to reduce possible 
complications, the patients will go back home feeling much better… No 
benefits whatsoever, but credibility will soar, I reckon’37
Preventing recurrences36 ‘The important thing is that it doesn't happen again’… ‘The point that 
should be made is that she knew she made a mistake and will try harder 
not to do that again to anybody else’36
Insufficient integration 
of open disclosure with 
improvement of patient 
safety31
‘At the end of the day, you know when an unfortunate incident happens 
like that, that [inappropriate disclosure communication] could be avoided 
in the future…it would be good to know that my dad's death, you know, 
sort of prompted some changes in that area’31
Health-care professional studies
Sometimes economical with the 
truth
How to disclose35 ‘I think you have to be a spin doctor all the time and put the right spin on 
it…I don't think you have to soft pedal the issue, but I think you have to 
try and put it in the best light. I think you have to be forthright with the 
patient to help them. And how you word it makes a big difference’35
Partial disclosure33 ‘The patient's gonna be told, but what you say about how that injury 
occurs depends’33
Attitudes and experiences 
concerning disclosing errors 
to patients38
‘If I think it could have been a serious error that might have caused this 
damage to the patient, it will be explained differently or in a way the 
patient cannot realise’38
(Continues)
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Third-order construct Second-order construct First-order constructs
Owning up without saying I’m sorry Responsibility42 ‘I made an error. I discontinued a medication that I shouldn't have-by 
accident. You know, I picked up the error, presented it to the family. You 
know I tried to make it a system thing because the reason I did it was not 
because I’m a dummy. I’m sure it could have happened to the next guy in 
my shoes but I felt it was my responsibility to tell the family and I did’42
How should open disclosure 
be carried out37
‘I don't literally bring up the word regrettable but I do it eventually…it's a 
Korean thing that you don't really need to put it into words to…the biggest 




Support for open disclosure34
removal, the last step of the surgery, the wound starts to open up. It'll 
drive you crazy and what can you say to the patient? Seems like you can't 
go home today…that's the Korean way of saying sorry…you don't really 
need to say it through words’37
‘I really don't know what happened. I really can't explain what happened, but 
it shouldn't have happened, and I have to take the responsibility for it’34
To tell or to not tell? When honesty 
may cause unnecessary anxiety 
Outcome determines disclosure
When should open disclosure 
take place32
‘If a patient is 95 and bed-ridden, you might not want to tell them…it could 
be upsetting, they will not understand this could happen to anyone with 
this case.’32
Attitudes and experiences 
concerning disclosing errors 
to patients38
‘You perceive this when dealing with patients; there are people who 
prefer not to know. And you need to somehow develop a sure instinct 
not to burden them’38
Whether to disclose near 
misses35
‘My job is to relieve anxiety, not to create it. And to a certain extent when 
an error occurs that doesn't get to the patient, it's not their problem, it's 
my problem’35
When should open disclosure 
take place37
‘I suppose medical errors causing minor harm will be even more 
problematic…Hmm I’d rather not say. This is a matter of preference I 
think. The patient might not feel the need either. Telling the truth is 
the right thing to do but since nothing really happened, I guess doctors 
would be inclined not to do so’37
Whether to disclose near 
misses35
‘I think if we were held to disclose all of those [near misses], I think 
that happens so often we wouldn't have the opportunity to practise 
medicine’35
Attitudes and experiences 
concerning disclosing errors 
to patients38
‘In general, the patient clearly has the right [to be informed], whether it is 
a small or big error. But when errors happen that have no effect on the 
patient, when nothing happens- small errors that have no effect or the 
patient would not see the error as an error- then we would not tell’38
Health-care professional studies- barriers to disclosure
Difficulty of disclosure in a blame 
culture
Institutional culture43 ‘There needs to be a culture where individuals do not feel penalised for 
reporting errors. You should feel comfortable reporting to the chief of 
service of the head of nursing’43
Reputation risk42 ‘I think there's an openness about- we've caught that near miss. Give 
everybody a pat on the back whereas if something then bad happens, I 
think there's less of an openness and then you get more into looking at well-
rather than what the system did, you look at the people in the system’42
Barriers to disclosure38 ‘The common working culture can be beneficial or also hindering. For 
example, if you have to fear reprisal once you disclose an error, that this 
falls back on a person who is then ostracised or even loses their job’38
Avoidance of litigation Understanding the 
repercussions41
‘I’ve learned that it's also quite a self-preserving thing to do…the worst 
thing…is if they [patients] get it into their heads that there's some sort 
of cover up going on, then they get the bit between their teeth and 
solicitors get involved and it's all very difficult’41
Reputation risk42 ‘If families for whatever reason feel that they have not received the best 
medical care, they're going to make a big stink and go to the paper and feel 
hard done by and I think in the situations where the families are pressing 
and the families raising doubts- it may be more difficult to disclose’42
Provider factors43 ‘…two is fear of being sued and what is that going to do with your future’43
TA B L E  2   (Continued)
(Continues)
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PCP [primary care physician] because I mean she took responsi-
bility…had remorse about what happened’.36 Patients responded 
positively to expressions of regret and apology, but only if these 
were perceived to be sincere. However, for some patients, an apol-
ogy alone was not sufficient; they wanted to be informed of the 
steps taken to correct the incident.36
5.2.3 | Promise of improvement
Patients and family members wanted to be assured that the HCPs 
and institution were working to prevent recurrences.31,35-37 Patients 
who had suffered due to the adverse event believed it was vital that 
the same error was not made with other patients.36 An important 
element in preventing recurrences was that those involved had learnt 
from the adverse event and the incident had resulted in institutional 
changes.36 Patients specified that in disclosure conversations, they 
would like their HCP to state ‘we assure you this problem will not 
happen again’.35
5.3 | Reciprocal translation of HCP studies
Reciprocal translation of the key concepts extracted from the 11 ‘HCP’ 
studies synthesized 3 third-order constructs: ‘sometimes economical 
with the truth’, ‘owning up without saying I’m sorry’ and ‘To tell or to not 
tell?’ which consisted of the following two subthemes: ‘when honesty 
may cause unnecessary anxiety’ and ‘outcome determines disclosure’.
5.3.1 | Sometimes economical with the truth
A predominant theme across some of the studies related to excluding 
some facts or information when providing the explanation.33,35,38-40 
HCPs including nurses and physicians advocated the disclosure 
of adverse events to patients and their families, but sometimes 
provided only partial and selected information to patients/ fam-
ily.33,35,38-40 Many HCPs described avoiding revealing too much 
truth to patient or families.33,35,38-40 Errors that resulted in adverse 
events with a more serious outcome were disclosed in such a way 
that it would not be directly obvious to the patient/family that an 
adverse event had occurred and the fault of the HCP(s) or the in-
stitution would be concealed.33,35,38,39 This was achieved in differ-
ent ways. At times, the error and the adverse event were described 
‘in the most positive spin and in a positive light’.35 Some HCPs ex-
plained the adverse event in clinical terms so that the patient/fami-
lies would find it difficult to establish the connection between the 
error and the resulting adverse event.38 Others described omitting 
certain information related to the adverse event. 33,38,39
5.3.2 | Owning up without saying I’m sorry
Most HCPs believed an important element of disclosure was to ac-
knowledge and accept responsibility for the adverse event.16,32,34,41-43 
Disclosing the event and admitting fault was considered to be a moral, 
ethical and professional duty.16,41,43 HCPs believed in ensuring the 
patient was made aware of this, even if the events leading up to the 
adverse event were not clear.34 In some situations, HCPs accepted re-
sponsibility for the adverse event; however, errors were often viewed 
as system faults rather than individual failures: ‘it could have been made 
by anyone else in my shoes’.42 However, in one study physicians did not 
explicitly disclose responsibility or express regret in specific terms.37 
This study was conducted with HCPs from a non-Westernized country 
(Korea), whereas HCPs who believed it was important to vocalize this 
acknowledgement to patients were based in Westernized countries. 
Unlike most Western countries, open disclosure policies have not yet 
been implemented in Korea, which may explain the difference in views.
Third-order construct Second-order construct First-order constructs
Disclosure is a learned skill Absence of disclosure 
education37
I have never learned (open disclosure). Can't make facial expressions. 
Can't come up with words to say… ‘I have never seen anyone do it, so I 
have no clue on how to do it’37
Role models and guidance41 ‘I haven't had any personal training. Certainly, the trust offers a sort of 
day if you like around breaking bad news, however I think that tends 
to be more related to breaking, you know, cancers and diagnoses type 
thing, rather than adverse events that happened41
Provider factors43 ‘As soon as it gets into the legal realm, suddenly as an attending physician, 
I feel like I need to be coached as to what can be said and how it can be 
said and so forth’43
Inconsistent guidance It all depends on your nurse 
manager15
‘She actually got a big lecture saying ‘you always run it by somebody 
before you disclose it to the families, because bedside nurses are not 
trained to discern litigiousness’…she felt like she did the right thing but 
was being told ‘don't do that again’16
Provider factors43 ‘The emphasis at least in my training, has been – don't talk about anything, 
keep quiet’43
Institutional culture43 I can say right now that I do not know what the policy is’43
TA B L E  2   (Continued)
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The importance of an apology in the disclosure conversation was 
only cited by HCPs in one study41 where there was a widespread be-
lief that an apology was not acceptance of liability and had no pro-
fessional and legal implications. However, this group described the 
existence previously of a culture where apologizing was considered to 
be an admission of liability.41 This culture may still exist elsewhere, and 
this could explain why apologizing was not discussed by HCPs in other 
studies. Conversely, some doctors believed that it was not necessary 
to state an apology as ‘you don't really need to say it through words’.37
5.3.3 | To tell or to not tell?
Within this theme, the data were fractured into two subthemes: 
‘when honesty may cause unnecessary anxiety’ and ‘outcome de-
termines disclosure’.
5.3.4 | When honesty may cause 
unnecessary anxiety
Health-care professionals assumed in cases where the error was not 
obvious or evident, the patient would rather not be informed.33,35,37,38 
Where it was felt the patient would be burdened by the disclosure, or 
it would cause unnecessary stress, the event was not disclosed: ‘if a pa-
tient is 95 and bed-ridden- you might not want to tell them’.33 One HCP 
related ‘My job is to relieve anxiety, not to create it’.35 Non-disclosure 
in such cases was rationalized as being in the patients best interests.
5.3.5 | Outcome determines disclosure
The impact of an error on the patient, whether it resulted in an 
adverse event, and the severity of the adverse event influenced 
whether disclosure occurred. When adverse events were minor 
or there was no substantial harm resulting from errors, disclosure 
was not believed to be of importance33,35,37-39,43 and was seen as 
impractical due to the frequent occurrence of these events.35 Lack 
of patient awareness of the error was also considered as a reason for 
non-disclosure.35,38,43 Disclosure of medical errors resulting in minor 
or no adverse events was compared to aviation errors by suggesting 
that near misses occur frequently in aviation; however, people would 
only be informed if they became aware of these.43 Conversely, one 
HCP endorsed the disclosure of errors, which did not lead to adverse 
events, and saw this as an opportunity to improve their trust with 
patients.35
5.4 | Reciprocal translation of HCP studies on 
barriers to disclosure
Reciprocal translation of the key concepts on the barriers to disclo-
sure synthesized 4 third-order constructs: ‘difficulty of disclosure in 
a blame culture’, ‘avoidance of litigation’, ‘disclosure is a learned skill’ 
and ‘inconsistent guidance’. These barriers described by HCPs may 
help to explain the differences between the two group's perspec-
tives on disclosure.
5.4.1 | Difficulty of disclosure in a blame culture
One of the commonly cited barriers to disclosing adverse events was 
a culture of blame, where these cultural barriers were either organi-
zational 35,38,41,43 or professional in origin.38,41-43 At times, it was dif-
ficult to distinguish between what constitutes as an organizational 
and professional/workplace barrier. Nurses, in particular, described 
their health-care organizations as having a closed culture, which 
inhibited openness with patients in relation to adverse events.38,43 
Non-disclosure was attributed to the institutional culture in which 
the HCPs were immersed.43 When adverse events occurred, blame 
was attributed towards individuals’ errors rather than system errors, 
which resulted in HCPs being apprehensive to disclose.42 Changes 
in the institutional culture were suggested by nurses, doctors and 
HCPs as a strategy to promote disclosure practices. This included 
the removal of a blame culture and the development of a culture of 
openness and transparency.43
Support and guidance from managers was described by nurses as 
a factor, which either positively or negatively influenced disclosure 
practices.16,43 Supportive managers were described as never attrib-
uting blame to the individual but being empathetic and understand-
ing as ‘this could happen to anybody’.16 On the other hand, HCPs 
conveyed that they would be less likely to disclose future adverse 
events if they believed they had been unfairly blamed or shamed 
in the past. One nurse provided an account where a colleague was 
reprimanded for disclosing an adverse event to a patient, leading to 
the belief that they were being discouraged from carrying out their 
professional and moral duty to inform the patient.16 In this situa-
tion, ‘she felt like she did the right thing, but was told, ‘don't do that 
again’.16
Worries and fear that a damaged reputation will accompany 
admittances of adverse events also hindered disclosure prac-
tices.35,38,42 HCPs described fear of admitting and openly disclosing 
adverse events due to worries about how they would be perceived 
by colleagues and whether their mistakes would be discussed within 
the organization.43 This was more so for the junior clinicians as they 
believed that there was an expectation to prove their competence.42 
Concerns about whether their mistakes would be discussed within 
the organization were also voiced.42
Fear of professional or workplace sanctions was also described 
as one of the reasons for concealing adverse events.38,41-43 This in-
cluded being fearful of disciplinary action that may be taken against 
them including losing their job,38,41 fear of being ostracized within 
their workplace38 and fear of damaging career opportunities ex-
pressed by physicians in particular.35,42 These sanctions that were 
put in place were found to be counterproductive in responding and 
disclosing future adverse events.38
578  |     SATTAR eT Al.
5.4.2 | Avoidance of litigation
A second category of barriers to disclosure comprised of fears 
about exposure to legal liability because of admitting and disclos-
ing an adverse event to patients.30,33,38,41,42 HCPs described wor-
ries that patient/family would take legal action against them if they 
took responsibility and were open and transparent about the ad-
verse event.35,41-43 HCP cited concerns that disclosure would result 
in patients/or family causing further issues if they felt that they 
had not received the best medical care.42 Furthermore, HCPs were 
apprehensive about including an apology in the disclosure conver-
sation as there was the belief that it may be considered as an ad-
mission of legal liability.35 The HCPs expressed a desire to be ‘just 
straightforward’ 35 about the adverse incident and the events that 
led to it, however, believed that in reality, this would result in a 
lawsuit.
HCPs from one UK study had contrasting views to this where 
they held the belief that patients/families would have a more ‘gen-
erous and understanding view’ of the adverse event if they were 
honest and upfront about the situation.41 These HCPs advocated 
disclosure and transparency and described witnessing adverse 
events, which resulted in harm to the patient, but legal action was 
not pursued due to open disclosure.41 The differences in HCPs’ 
views in this study may have been influenced by the recent duty 
of candour regulation, which was implemented in the UK two years 
prior to this study. Some HCPs acknowledged litigation fears as a 
barrier to disclosure, but regardless of these fears, they believed dis-
closure enhanced the patient-provider relationship and was there-
fore considered as valuable.41
5.4.3 | Disclosure is a learned skill
HCPs described that a lack of training or the absence of disclosure 
education led to a lack of confidence in skills, which resulted in hin-
dered disclosure practices.37,38,41,43 The value of open disclosure 
education was recognized; however, one HCP related ‘I haven't 
had any personal training’.41 Similarly, other HCPs reinforced the 
importance of training specific to disclosing adverse events, but 
stated that they had only received training on how to break bad 
news to patients and had not received any training specific to ad-
verse event disclosure.37,38,43 HCPs believed that they lacked skills 
on how to communicate certain aspects of the adverse events. This 
lack of skills led to a lack of confidence when conducting the dis-
closure.43 No training was provided from a legal perspective, and 
HCPs believed when it came to the legal aspects, they required 
more educational support.43 A situation was described where the 
HCP was remorseful about what had happened; however, he ‘just 
didn't know how to express or convey it’.37 Regardless of which 
country HCPs belonged to, a distinct need for education and train-
ing in this area was expressed by HCPs,37,38,41,43 suggesting that a 
lack of training is a universal issue.
5.4.4 | Inconsistent guidance
HCPs described that there was a lack of clarity on what should be 
disclosed, when and how, as they were provided with varying guid-
ance from seniors or management within their organization.16,38,41,43 
HCPs were provided with contradictory views on whether they 
should disclose the adverse event. Instances were described where 
HCPs were asked to refrain from disclosing the adverse event to 
colleagues or the patient/family.16,41,43 Lack of awareness of or-
ganizational policies related to adverse event disclosure also made 
this process challenging.16,43 Some HCPs were simply unaware of 
the existence of these policies, whereas others suggested the policy 
needed to be made known and enforced in the organization as the 
existence of a policy alone did not ensure that appropriate disclo-
sure practices would take place.42 Furthermore, some HCPs held the 
belief that awareness and implementation of organizational policies 
could promote openness if guidelines for disclosure were provided.16
5.5 | Lines-of-argument synthesis
The syntheses of ‘patient’ and ‘health-care professional’ (HCP/HCPs) 
studies in this review revealed that there was a disconnect between 
the perspectives of these two groups on how disclosure should 
be conducted and what the disclosure conversation should entail. 
These key differences are discussed in relation to the barriers to dis-
closure faced by HCPs.
There was a difference between patients and HCPs in their expec-
tations and attitudes about what the disclosure conversation should 
include. HCPs of different clinical professions had similar perspectives 
regarding disclosure. Although only two studies included family mem-
bers,31,32 their views were in agreement with those of patients. Patients 
emphasized their right to receive all the relevant information related to 
the adverse event, but described not receiving the information they 
needed from HCPs.30-33 HCPs also acknowledged the importance of 
disclosure but said that often they would omit some information from 
the conversation.33,35,38-40 A majority of the time, HCPs did not pro-
vide patients with the breadth of information they required. This could 
be explained by the barriers HCPs were faced with. They described 
worries that they would be exposed to litigation if they were open and 
transparent with patients.35,38,41-43 Some expressed their desire to be 
straightforward but believed this would result in a lawsuit.35 There has 
recently been more awareness that open disclosure does not necessar-
ily increase litigation risk, which was reflected by HCPs in one of the 
later studies conducted in the UK.41 Within this study, HCPs acknowl-
edged that the issue of litigation did exist, but believed that patients 
had a more generous and understanding view if they were honest and 
transparent. These professionals also described witnessing adverse 
events, which resulted in harm, but which did not result in patients 
pursuing legal action due to the practice of open disclosure.
Apologizing and taking responsibility was an element that many 
patients/family members considered to be an important aspect of 
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disclosure.30-32 Many patients wanted an apology from the HCPs 
as they felt this signified an expression of regret. However, HCPs 
from only one study cited the importance of including an apology 
in the disclosure conversation. Some professionals were worried 
that an apology would be interpreted as evidence, which could be 
used to prove legal liability. There has been a previous existence 
of a culture where apologizing was considered as an admission 
of legal liability, and it is possible this culture still existed whilst 
most of these studies were conducted (between 2003 and 2017). 
Patients also wanted assurance that recurrences of the same ad-
verse event would be prevented31,35-37; however, the importance 
of this element was not acknowledged by HCPs in the included 
studies.
Finally, a lack of certainty, skill and confidence about how to dis-
close adverse events may have prevented many HCPs from deliver-
ing a disclosure, which included all the elements patients expressed 
a desire for. Regardless of clinical profession, many HCPs had not 
received training on how to effectively communicate the adverse 
event to patients,37,38,41,43 which could have contributed to the gap 
between the information patients felt they needed and the informa-
tion HCPs delivered in practice.
Altogether, this lines-of-argument synthesis identified both the 
key elements of an ideal disclosure conversation desired by patients 
and the facilitators for HCPs, which can increase the likelihood of 
this taking place (Figure 1).
6  | DISCUSSION
6.1 | Summary of results
This meta-ethnographic synthesis highlighted that there is a dif-
ference in attitudes and expectations between patients and HCPs 
regarding the disclosure conversation. Patients and families advo-
cated disclosure following an adverse event. They expressed a need 
for certain information including accountability and an apology, and 
a commitment to prevent the same adverse event from occurring 
again. However, a majority of the time, patients did not feel satisfied 
with the disclosure or felt they were provided with partial disclosure, 
which did not include all the elements they desired.30,31,33,38,40 HCPs 
considered disclosure to be a moral and professional duty16,41,43; 
however, multiple barriers prevented them from carrying out this 
disclosure. These include an organizational culture of blame, litiga-
tion fears and lack of skills and training on how to conduct disclo-
sure. The findings of this review suggest that there is an evident gap 
between the expected communication practice and what is being 
done.
6.2 | Strengths and limitations
Strengths of meta-ethnographic approaches include their pres-
ervation of the interpretative properties of the primary data44 
and their potential to provide higher levels of analysis.28 Meta-
ethnography is inevitably limited by the breadth and quality of 
studies24; the articles included within this review were identified 
using a systematic approach, which enabled the identification of all 
relevant studies published within the area of disclosure. Although 
a comprehensive systematic search was undertaken, it is possible 
that not all the relevant studies were retrieved. The necessary in-
clusion of studies from different countries could be considered to 
be a further limitation as each country has a different health-care 
system, thereby making the transferability of findings difficult. 
Also, due to the different health-care systems represented in the 
literature, there is a lack of transferability of the legal aspects of 
disclosure. Therefore, the legal barriers to disclosure perceived by 
HCPs may vary accordingly across countries. Also, a potential limi-
tation is that all of the included patient studies were conducted in 
Westernized countries including the USA, Australia and Canada. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the literature represents the 
views and cultural expectations of a Westernized culture. One of 
the reasons why a majority of the research may be conducted in 
F I G U R E  1   Ideal disclosure practice and facilitators to effective and practicable disclosure for health-care professionals
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Western countries is that there are laws and policies in place in 
these countries, which require patients to be informed of all as-
pects of their care, including any unanticipated outcomes.
6.3 | Implications for clinicians, policymakers and 
researchers
This review has highlighted that there is a gap between what pa-
tients desire from disclosure and what HCPs offer. The lines-of-
argument synthesis highlighted the following ways in which this 
gap can be reduced. At an organizational level, there is a need to 
develop consistent and transparent policies and promote and en-
force these within organizations.16,38,41,43 Also, shifting away from 
the existence of a blame culture and the development of an open 
and transparent culture can help facilitate effective disclosure 
practices.35,38,41-43 One of the frequently cited barriers to disclo-
sure was fear of litigation. However, patients described that they 
sought legal help when they did not receive appropriate disclosure 
(eg HCPs failed to apologize or take responsibility for the adverse 
event). Patients did not desire to punish HCPs or collect large sums 
of money. Therefore, it is imperative that HCPs receive education 
regarding the legal aspects of disclosure, including the legal pro-
tections that are currently in place and reasons why patients seek 
legal support.
NICE (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence), which 
provides national guidance and advice to improve health and social 
care within the UK, highlights the importance of HCPs being profi-
cient in communication skills,45 and disclosure is a complex commu-
nication task. The findings of this review showed that HCPs required 
more adverse event disclosure training.37,38,41,43 A number of studies 
have developed and discussed adverse event disclosure educational 
programmes, which have used a variety of teaching methods.46-51 
However at an organizational level, these disclosure educational pro-
grammes need to be integrated into training programmes for HCPs.
HCPs also expressed worry and anxiety about disclosure. 
These worries stemmed from a blame culture, which surrounded 
health-care organizations, risk of damaging reputation and fear of 
litigation.35,38,41-43 More clarity and guidance is needed on what 
constitutes relevant information that is provided during disclosure, 
as patients and HCPs have different perceptions regarding this. 
HCPs also held inaccurate assumptions about what patients/fam-
ily members would want to be disclosed.33,35,37,38 Providing HCPs 
with disclosure training that is specific to adverse events is one of 
the potential ways to improve this process. Training interventions 
should be informed by the elements patients desire from disclosure 
and guidance from recent disclosure policies. Educating HCPs on the 
benefits of taking a patient-centred approach when disclosing ad-
verse events is one of the potential ways to meet patients’ needs. 
This would include thinking beyond the HCPs’ own beliefs and deem 
what is important for patients. Involving patients/family members in 
the adverse event investigation is another one of the potential ways 
to meet the needs of this group.
7  | CONCLUSION
This is the first qualitative meta-ethnography of patients’ and 
HCPs’ experiences of adverse event disclosure. Our findings sug-
gest that although patients and HCPs both advocate disclosure, 
a number of barriers prevent HCPs from carrying out disclosure 
effectively. HCPs also hold inaccurate beliefs about when and 
what patients want to be disclosed. To meet patients’ needs for 
disclosure, training on disclosure for HCPs and the development 
of an open, transparent culture within organizations are potential 
areas for intervention. Also, the responses of patients and rela-
tives are not fully predictable and even the best of open disclosure 
practices may not resolve their problems or concerns. Therefore, 
it is important that guidance and training for HCPs reflect these 
challenges.
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